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Some Problems with “New View” of
 Adam Smith
Recently, a “new, optimistic, theistic view” of Adam Smith has arisen, 
challenging the old, secular view of Smith.  In the “new view,” Smith adopts two 
types of teleology: teleology immanent in the human constitution and historical 
teleology.  The latter is primarily addressed here; in this teleological view of 
history the divine “plan” progressively realizes the ideal society in practice and 
this form of “historical optimism” has some foundation in Smith’s writings. 
Several varieties of the “new view” exist; three of these are examined below 
in the light of the full range of Smith’s historical writings.  Actually, Smith’s 
“optimistic” version of history coexists with a “pessimistic” version.  In short, 
this article seeks to sketch out the “new view” of Smith and the problem for it 
posed by his “pessimistic” views of history. 
This article has five sections.  The first section summarizes the “new view” 
of Smith.  The second section discusses a problem for the “new view”: various 
“pessimistic” themes in Smith’s writings which suggest flaws in the divine 
design.  The third section considers responses to the problem by two groups of 
commentators within the “new view.”  The fourth section discusses the adequacy 
of one of these responses in the light of both other evidence and a third version 
of the “new view.”  The final section provides a brief conclusion.
a) The “New View” of Nature, Human Nature and Commercial(1) 
Society
This section addresses several topics.  First, we discuss the theistic 
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foundation of the “new view” in the light of the prevailing view of Smith. 
Second, we turn to the “new view” of Smith’s understanding of nature and 
human nature.  Smith identifies several ends of human nature.  What are they? 
How are they achieved?  Third, in the light of his view of nature, we turn to the 
“new view” of Smith’s interpretation of history.  Does it propose that Smith had 
a teleological view of human history?  Finally, what are the political implications 
of these views?  Let us begin with the prevailing interpretation of Smith. 
After World War II the view arose that Smith was a Humean: a secular 
thinker who denied any role for final causal explanations (see Kleer, 2000, p.25). 
Some of these mainstream commentators conceded that theistic and teleological 
passages existed in Smith’s work but these could be removed without harming 
his argument (Kleer, 2000, pp.14-6).  Such interpretations have been challenged 
over the last decade or so by the “new view”; while the secular view remains 
dominant, support for the “new view” of Smith has grown.(2)
The “new view” is that Smith is a theist and his theology cannot be removed 
without harming his argument.(3)  According to Kleer, “the principle of a 
benevolent divine author of nature must be considered as one of the cornerstones 
of Smith’s system of moral philosophy.”(4)  Waterman says that Smith’s Wealth 
of Nations (WN hereafter) is “entirely ‘natural theology’” (2002, p.918). 
Clarke refers to “the Christian Stoic foundation of Smith’s work” (2000, p.67). 
Advocates of the “new view” deny that Smith was a Humean on theological 
matters (Fitzgibbons, 1995, pp.28-32, 86-9, 94, 127).  With this background in 
mind, let us turn to some of the details of the “new view.”
Denis says that Smith “sees nature, including human nature, as a vast 
machine supervised by God and designed to maximize human happiness” (1999, 
p.71).  It “is a coherent system: ‘[E]ven the smallest of the co-existent parts of 
the universe, are exactly fitted to one another, and all contribute to compose one 
immense and connected system’” (Hill, 2001, p.13, quoting Smith, 1976, p.289). 
Similarly, Evensky says that Smith adopted the language of “Design,” which 
attributes the observed order in the universe to a “benevolent Deity as designer” 
(1989, p.124).  Smith “relies heavily on teleological arguments” (Hill, 2001, p.10; 
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see pp. 5, 9, 19; see Kleer, 2000).  
Like other “new view” adherents, Hill finds two types of teleology in Smith. 
First, she finds teleology immanent in the human constitution; hence, Smith 
“believes that by acting through ... base instincts ... humans ‘co-operate with the 
Deity’ and serve to ‘advance’ his ‘plan’” (Hill, 2001, p. 10, quoting Smith, 1976, 
p.166).  The instincts are the efficient causes but they were designed in order 
to achieve the various final causes (benevolent ends, which will be discussed 
shortly).  Second, Hill also finds teleology operating in history: human beings, 
as “the principal bearers of history ... [are] engaged in fulfilling the Creator’s 
telic plans” (2001, p. 10; see pp. 10-1, 13).  We will discuss this metatheoretical 
view of history further shortly but let us now discuss the logical consequence of 
a teleological view of nature: the telos, or end.
Hill provides the best “new view” account of the ends of human nature. 
She attributes to Smith (explicitly or implicitly) the following ends: “survival”; 
“perpetuation” and “population growth”; “generalized order”; “happiness”; 
“prosperity,” “material abundance” and “material comfort” (Hill, 2001, pp. 10-2, 
14, 16, 19).  Something like this complex and elevated set of ends is accepted 
by other “new view” commentators.  In addition, in Hill’s view of Smith, “under 
a Providential regime” there is good cause to believe that these ends will be 
achieved over time (2001, p. 12).  
This takes us back to the teleological view of history, which many adherents 
of the “new view” perceive in Smith.  In Hill’s presentation, Smith has such 
a view of history, combining the stadial theory of history with the view of 
continuing economic growth; once again, the driving factors are human instincts 
(see 2001, pp. 10-12, 20).  A sketch of this “optimistic” view of the path of 
history follows.
In Hill’s view of Smith, “all societies had, or would move through a 
sequence of distinct stages of development,” namely, hunting, shepherding, 
farming and commerce (2001, p. 18; see Smith, 1979, pp.689-95).  Further, 
Smith “perceived a distinct and universal pattern to this development” which 
also helped satisfy the human ends; Hill contrasts “the forlorn poverty of the 
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‘savage’ age with the ‘general security and happiness’” in the commercial 
era (2001, p. 18 emphasis added, and p.12, quoting Smith, 1976, p.205).  The 
“Providential” pattern showed “the Creator’s telic plans for ... progressivism in 
human affairs” (Hill, 2001, pp.18, 10).  Now let discuss the theory of economic 
growth.
Kleer (2000) gives the best “new view” presentation of Smith’s account of 
economic growth.  In his presentation of Smith there are at least four factors 
responsible for economic growth: the division of labour; capital accumulation; 
order and good government (two preconditions for capital accumulation); and 
discretion for capital owners to invest wherever they choose.  Kleer discusses 
these in turn, tracing them back to human instincts: these include our desire to 
persuade; the pleasure we derive from “mutual sympathy” (namely, when an 
agent knows that his own sentiments are “equal in intensity to the spectator’s 
sympathetic emotions”); our greater capacity to sympathize with joy than with 
sorrow; and the pleasure that we derive from “well-crafted devices.”(5)  
If one reconstructs other “new view” reconstructions of Smith, one finds 
many of the elements outlined by Kleer (see Hill, 2001, pp. 14, 18, 20).  It 
is also important to note that continuing economic growth is linked by “new 
view” adherents, like Hill, to the satisfaction of divine purposes: happiness and 
population growth.  First, Hill states that, “for Smith, happiness is a function of 
material prosperity” (2001, p. 12, citing Smith, 1979, p.96).  Second, “population 
increases as a spontaneous by-product of material prosperity” (Hill, 2001, p. 12 
citing Smith, 1979, pp.97, 99, 180; 1978, p.159).
What are the implications of these “optimistic” views?  Here we again focus 
on Hill’s account.  For Hill, Smith has a “two-tiered model” of human society with 
a “clear line of demarcation” between the tiers: the first tier, the “big picture,” or 
“social systems level,” is under divine control and “the realm of Final Causes”; 
the second tier is the “individual goal level” and, whilst allowing some scope 
for human free will there, “[i]ndividual agents represent efficient causes” (2001, 
pp. 14-5; see p. 11).  Given the supreme rationality of the “system” level, Smith’
s well-known disparagement of human rationality makes perfect sense; “human 
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design is redundant” (Hill, 2001, p. 7).  Humans must follow their well-designed 
passions and exercise their limited rationality in learning not to interfere in the 
operations of nature at the “system” level.  “The grandiose schemes of ‘Great 
Legislators’ are cast in a blasphemous light” (Hill, 2001, p. 15).  
In short, in the “new view”, Smith is interpreted as a theist with an 
“optimistic” view of nature, human nature and the path of history.  Next, we 
discuss some elements in Smith’s writings which apparently contradict the 
“optimistic” picture presented above.
b) Smith’s “Pessimistic” View of History
There are various “pessimistic” views in Smith’s writings.  I will discuss 
these under three headings: “pessimism” about the ability of societies to evolve 
into the ideal (a specific type of commercial society); “pessimism” about the 
goodness of commercial society as it matures; and “pessimism” about the 
permanence of such a society.(6) 
Let us begin with Smith’s “pessimism” concerning the emergence of the 
ideal society.  First, Smith suggests that slavery will persist throughout history, 
thus thwarting the satisfaction of the ends of nature for many (1978, pp.186-7). 
Second, he says that, due to climate and terrain, “the Tartars always have been,” 
and “always” will be, “a nation of shepherds”; the Tartars, and presumably 
others, cannot even reach the agricultural epoch (Smith, 1978, p. 220; see also 
pp.213,221-3,408.).  Thus, the emergence of the best regime can be thwarted. 
Smith also expresses “pessimistic” views about commercial society as it 
matures.
The division of labour progresses exponentially and, as we saw, is a 
fundamental cause of economic growth.  It also features, however, in the 
“dark side” of Smith perceived by Marx and Heilbroner (Marx, 1954, p.342; 
Heilbroner, 1973).  Smith says that, eventually, most of the population are 
employed in monotonous occupations; this “confines the views of men” and 
the “low [class] people” become “exceedingly stupid” (1978, p. 539).  Further, 
as commercial society develops, it neglects education and the martial spirit “is 
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almost utterly extinguished” (Smith, 1978, p. 541).  Finally--with the drift of the 
population from the small, rural, communities to the large, anonymous, cities-
-the people drift towards “profligacy and vice” (Smith, 1979, p.795).  These 
negative moral consequences of commercial society have been cited as examples 
of Smith’s “historical pessimism” (Winch, 1978, p.117; see also Heilbroner, 
1973).
Now let us turn to the termination of the growth process in a permanent 
stationary state.  Smith’s hints at the emergence of stasis, have been frequently 
discussed in the history of economic thought literature (see Hollander, 1987, 
pp.66, 84, 163, 176).  In the permanent stasis: “both the wages of labour and 
the profits of stock would probably be very low .... [Wages would be] barely 
sufficient to keep up the number of labourers, and ... [the population] could never 
be augmented” (Smith, 1979, p.111).  The primary cause of such stationarity in 
Smith’s analysis was land scarcity, but also assumed were diminishing returns 
in agriculture, a limited role for technological improvement and a “Malthusian” 
sexual instinct (see Smith, 1979, p.109; Hollander, 1987, pp.162-5).
What are the implications of the decline into permanent stasis?  Once the 
profit rate reaches the very low equilibrium level, virtually everyone--even 
those who were previously rich--would be forced to work (Smith, 1979, p.113). 
The stationary state is “hard” and “dull” for the “labouring poor”; the “scanty 
subsistence” of the lower classes causes such a high infant mortality rate as to 
just maintain the equilibrium population.(7)  At this low standard of living, the 
society fails to meet various human ends attributed to Smith by Hill: material 
prosperity, happiness and population growth.(8)  
Next, let us discuss Smith’s view of the death awaiting all societies.(9)  Smith 
suggests a number of scenarios for the collapse of commercial societies, two of 
which are presented here: external or internal subjugation; and the consequences 
of debt accumulation. 
Smith discusses, at length, military affairs and their relevance to commercial 
societies.  In the case of the classical commercial societies, Smith blames the 
improvements of the arts, sciences, manufactures and commerce for the decline 
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in martial virtue (mentioned earlier) and for the people’s unwillingness to go to 
war; even the members of the upper classes no longer wish to provide military 
leadership.  “Thus it must happen that the improvement of arts and commerce” 
lead to “a great declension in the force and power” of the classical republics “in 
all cases” (Smith, 1978, p.231 emphasis added).  At this stage a standing army 
becomes essential but many states fail to institute it.  Even if it is adopted, it 
culminates in the subjugation of the people by the leading general; the republic 
is transformed into a “military monarchy” (Smith, 1978, p.237).  Even this form 
of government, as shown by the Roman case, carries the same fatal disease: 
“But this government, as all others, seems to have a certain and fixed end which 
concludes it” because the improvements of the arts and commerce “necessarily ... 
renders the people unwilling to go to war” (Smith, 1978, p.238 emphasis added; 
see also p.414).  So, Smith showed that all classical commercial forms of society 
inevitably collapsed. 
The second scenario for the collapse of commercial governments is the 
tendency of governments, at least modern ones, to accumulate debts.  Servicing 
a growing foreign currency debt is clearly a problem, but Smith adds that, even 
if all of the debt was owed to domestic investors, a large and growing debt is still 
“pernicious” (1979, p.927).  It will lead initially to increased taxation (causing 
domestic capital flight) and ultimately to the devaluation of the currency 
(thus punishing the industrious and frugal of those remaining) (Smith, 1979, 
pp.927-9).  This will severely retard the “natural progress of a nation towards 
wealth and prosperity” (Smith, 1979, p.674).  Smith concludes that eventually 
the burden of debt will “probably ruin, all the great nations of Europe” (Smith, 
1979, p.911 emphasis added; see also pp.497,928-9; cf. pp.342-3).  Despite 
recommending policies to reduce the debt, Smith is not “optimistic” about their 
potential success (Winch, 1978, p.136).  Once again, doom is on the horizon.
Significant barriers exist in the path to the ideal society and some societies 
are doomed to remain at a pre-commercial stage.  Second, sociological and 
economic problems lie ahead for commercial societies as they mature.  Even 
if no country had yet reached permanent stasis, Smith claims that two hundred 
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years is “as long as ... human prosperity usually endures” (1979, p.425; see also 
pp.365-7).  Third, regardless of which explanation is adopted, Smith says that 
commercial societies inevitably collapse; he apparently accepts a cyclical theory 
of history.  Hence, contrary to Hill, and other “new view” advocates, Smith 
seems to hold that the divine design is badly flawed.  Having highlighted Smith’
s “pessimism,” we now turn to some of the “new view” responses to it.
c) Two “New View” Responses
The varied response to the problem of Smith’s “pessimism” highlights the 
variety of views within the “new view” itself.(10)  Some maintain that, despite 
appearances to the contrary, Smith believed in the perfection of the Divine 
design; I have called them the “Panglossians.”  Others concede that Smith’
s “pessimistic” utterances necessitate revision to the sanguine view outlined 
previously; I call them the “realists.”  Let us begin with the “Panglossians.”
The “Panglossian” branch of the “new view” is exemplified by Denis.  In 
his account, for Smith: “we truly live in a Panglossian ‘best of all possible 
worlds.’... [A]ny appearances to the contrary are a result of our finite, partial 
view of the world” (1999, p.73).  Similarly, Hill says that Smith conceives the 
universe “in optimistic terms as perfect and self-regulating ... all of Nature’s 
works, including apparent defects, are accommodated within a vast, purposeful, 
beneficent perfection” (2001, pp.7, 21 see also pp. 12, 15-6).  This view does 
not do justice to Smith’s anguish about the path that commercial societies are 
following (see Alvey, 2003, p.267).
More detailed attention is warranted for the “realists,” namely, Evensky and 
Tanaka.  As Tanaka essentially follows Evensky on this theme, we will consider 
the latter’s view in detail.  He says that: “Smith combined the languages of the 
Newtonian scientific method, the Design argument, ... civil jurisprudence, ... 
social psychology ...[and] civic humanism” (Evensky, 1989, pp.125-6).  The 
thrust of Evensky’s article is to show that, during his lifetime, Smith became 
more “pessimistic” about Design and increasingly adopted a “civic” voice.
According to Evensky, in his early works--the Lectures on Jurisprudence 
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(LJ hereafter) and the early editions of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS 
hereafter)--Smith suggests “that human kind is in some long historical sense 
progressing toward the ideal state”; the divine design is evident in history (1989, 
p.128).(11)  Complicating even this initial presentation, however, is his assessment 
that Smith’s “jurisprudentially based” ideal, whilst asymptotically approached, is 
never achievable.(12)  The teleological view of history adopted by Hill is endorsed 
with a wrinkle that the end of history is not the ideal but just an “approximation” 
to it.  Contrary to Hill and Denis, Smith’s early work “was sanguine but it was 
not Panglossian” (Evensky, 1989, p.131).
As indicated above, even in his early work Smith saw certain problems with 
the emergence and development of commercial society (Evensky, 1989, p.131). 
Arrival at the commercial stage could be impeded by “natural impediments” 
or “the oppression[s] of civil government”; the latter were “historical artifacts” 
and “the rising tide of social progress” would eliminate them (Evensky, 1989, 
pp.131-2 citing Smith, 1978, p.521).  In addition to these, Evensky also refers to 
several problems which were produced by the evolution of commercial society 
itself: the stupefying effects of the division of labour, the “neglect of education” 
and the “diminution of the martial spirit” of the citizenry (1989, p.131; citing 
Smith, 1978, pp.539-41).  While Hill mentions the first of these, Evensky 
demonstrates a greater awareness of Smith’s “pessimistic” views.
Smith’s second phase was the period 1773-76, when he was in London, 
revising his drafts for the initial publication of the WN.  By the time the 
first edition of the WN was published, Smith still presented “the progressive 
evolution of society” but his “tone ... was less sanguine than before”; at this 
stage he adopted a “new role of social critic” (Evensky, 1989, pp.131-2). 
When he became less “optimistic” that “the natural evolution of society” was 
“progress towards the ideal,” he adopted the civic humanist voice in order to 
actively assist in “realizing that ideal” (Evensky, 1989, p.132).  The cause of 
this change of mood Evensky traces to the transformation of British politics 
during the eighteenth century: at the beginning of the century parliamentarians 
were public spirited; by the 1760s they were corrupted by patronage and swayed 
